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標題: [蘭德：現在美國空軍全上陣 也“協防”不了台灣][觀察者網][2017-3-20] [打印本頁]
作者: 8079645 時間: 2017-3-20 11:49 PM 標題: [蘭德：現在美國空軍全上陣 也“協防”不了台灣][觀察者網][2017-3-20]
本帖最後由 8079645 於 2017-3-20 11:49 PM 編輯
美《國家利益》雜志發文稱美軍要在台灣上空取得空中優勢需要30個空軍聯隊，2000多架戰斗機的兵力，超過了美國制空戰斗機總數（美國空軍現役戰斗機有F-16 1017架；F-15C/D型193架；F-15E型219架，F-22A型186架；F-35A型47架，總計1662架），這一消息引起國際國內媒体爭相轉載。
《國家利益》的這篇文章，其實是蘭德公司今年年度重磅報告《中美軍力積分卡》中關于中美在台灣和南海制空權相對優勢部分的簡報。《中美軍力積分卡》報告全文有400多頁內容，涉及了中美從局部摩擦到全面核戰在內的多種假想對抗情況。以下是蘭德公司《中美制空能力——對相對優勢的評估，1996-2017》的全文翻譯：
[attach]118112027[/attach]
駐關島的美軍F-15戰斗機
在過去的20年里，中國人民解放軍已從一支龐大而過時的力量轉變為一支實力强大的現代化軍隊。蘭德公司關于空軍的報告評估了中美兩軍1996-2017年間，在至中國本土距離不同的多個戰區發生對抗的情況。總的結論是，盡管與美國空軍相比，中國空軍在總体軍事裝備和軍事行動技巧方面仍有不足，但它在多個關鍵領域的進步縮小了與美國空軍的差距。此外，報告發現，中國不需要完全趕上美國，也可以在靠近中國大陸的地區執行有效的作戰行動，構成對美國的挑戰。需要澄清，（這一研究的）目的是為了避免戰爭，盡管學者們都認為不大可能發生這樣的戰爭，同時戰爭也將是兩個國家的災難。此外，這項研究也提供了一項對衝突的開源評估，這可能對美國的防御和威懾效果產生影響，此外這也將為未來評估提供新的標准。
聚焦制空權
本簡報聚焦于中國相對進步速度很快的一個領域：在亞洲地區軍事衝突中能對抗美國空中優勢的能力。歷史上，中國空軍對其鄰國並沒有產生重大威脅。但是，在過去20年中，中國已經對其空中力量實現了快速的現代化。回顧1996年，當時中國剛剛獲得其首批24架第四代戰斗機（觀察者網注：中國向俄羅斯購買首批蘇-27SK戰斗機），現在它已經擁有超過700架。美國在同一時期已經裝備了第五代戰斗機，同時它仍擁有一支更加先進且更加龐大的第四代戰斗機部隊。然而，美國的總体優勢卻受到地理和態勢因素的平衡：在亞洲發生衝突的情況下，中國總是享有地理上臨近戰區的優勢。中國空軍可以使用遠多于美國的軍事基地，這允許它在一場衝突中投入更多的戰斗機，而它的關鍵節點既可以在遠距離上隱藏起來，也可以在加固后有效抵抗攻擊。此外，美國靠近前沿的空軍基地還可能被中國導彈攻擊，這將降低它們支援作戰的能力。
[attach]118111989[/attach]
圖1：在台灣戰役條件下，取得空中優勢所需要投入的美國戰斗機聯隊數量
中國空軍的進步，美國空軍的反應，以及其他態勢因素將如何影響制空權爭奪戰？為了評估這個問題，研究者們建立了四個不同時間點的空戰模型，選取的時間段為1996-2017年間，兩個假想衝突地點至中國海岸的距離不同：一個是台灣衝突，另一個是南沙群島的衝突。在每個不同的假想情況中，他們都計算了美國軍隊如果要達到兩個不同目的，需要投入戰區的戰斗機聯隊數量（每個連隊72架飛機）。第一個目的的要求更高，要求保持持續的制空權，有效擊敗中國全面空中進攻。第二個目的則是在長時間對抗中摧毀足夠多的中國飛機，以迫使中國軍方領導人放棄空中戰役——分析家們設定為摧毀50%參加戰役的中國空軍力量。在后一種情況中，研究者們又分兩種情況來進行討論，分別為在7天內或21天內奪取制空權。
[attach]118112045[/attach]
駐韓國烏山的美軍F-16和A-10戰斗機，這是距離中國空軍基地最近的一支美國空軍部隊
空戰模型的變量包括公開的不同類型戰斗機的性能參數；參戰飛機總數和類型；參戰空對空武器數量；空軍基地的位置、類型和數量；估計雙方飛機和人員的妥善率；進入和飛離戰區所需飛行時間；此外，美國空軍飛行員訓練上的優勢也有所体現。最終的結果並非對衝突情況的精確預言。其目的在于提供一副制空權平衡演化情況的圖像，對每個衝突發生時間點所需投入的總兵力進行預計的同時，也對情況演變方向和速度進行預估。
在台灣戰役中，中國的地緣優勢体現得最為明顯，在這一情況下，中國可以動用的基地非常多，且距離戰區距離很近。而美軍只能使用距離戰區遙遠，且受到限制的少數地點。這一不足在1996年時似乎無關緊要，當時中國只能在戰役中動用一支裝備落后且規模不大的空中力量。但現在隨著中國航空兵和導彈部隊的發展，這些因素越來越重要。
圖1說明了雙方制空權平衡演變的情況。圖中用淡藍色柱表示，美國只需要兩個聯隊就能在1996年的整個衝突期間保持全天候的空中統治權。但到了2010年，隨著中國空軍和導彈能力的增長，這個數字變成9-20個聯隊（取決于美國使用基地的位置）。部署這個達到最高目標所需的聯隊數量几乎已超過美國戰斗機聯隊總數（注：目前美國空軍現役戰斗機聯隊總數為21個），而在戰斗機能夠趕到前線有效作戰的范圍內的基地肯定無法支持即使是遠小于此數字的聯隊（尤其是考慮到還要在基地內駐扎支持作戰的加油機）。換言之從2010年開始，在衝突初期奪取全天候的空中統治權已經，且至今仍是，不可能的。
[attach]118112098[/attach]
F-22A戰斗機多次短期部署到衝繩基地
但美國仍可通過其他辦法在一場持續的衝突中設法戰勝中國空中進攻。但一樣，解放軍空中力量的現代化正讓這樣的一場戰役挑戰性與日俱增。圖表中用藍色柱和深藍色柱分別表示了在一場為期7天或21天的作戰中消滅中國參戰50%飛機所需的聯隊數量。即使在這種消耗戰模式下，到2017年，要達到目標也越來越難，因為這需要投入更多的飛機，而在中國導彈攻擊下仍能安全運作的基地卻越來越少。
上述結果需要在一定的背景下來理解。在上述所有情況下，中國都無法奪得空中優勢，而美國戰斗機也都能達成很高的敵我戰損比。將作戰目標放寬到21天內奪取制空權可以減少美國將戰斗機部署到受威脅的基地的需求，也可以減少空軍基地的后勤壓力。然而，在美國空軍奪取制空權之前，解放軍空中力量將可以放手攻擊台灣的地面目標。進攻台灣的地面戰役將會很快打出結果，如果美國空軍不能在這段時間內奪取制空權將使美軍及其友軍無法得到急需的空中支援。
對南沙群島戰役的評估
在南沙群島衝突假想情況下，美國制空權受到的挑戰要小一些。盡管中國空中能力的現代化已經顯著增加了美國取勝所需的兵力，但這個海域距離中國大陸比台灣遠得多。在這一情況下，地緣因素將不利于中國。在1996到2003年間，中國只有很少飛機能夠不經中途加油飛抵這里實施作戰。到2017年，中國可以投入一支能力强得多的戰斗機和攻擊機分隊（包括蘇-27、蘇-30MKK、殲轟-7和轟-6轟炸機）用于打擊這一地區的目標，盡管這其中許多飛機都是在其最大航程邊緣作戰，而其總數可能因廣州軍區可用機場數量較少而受到限制。
[attach]118112138[/attach]
圖2.在南沙群島衝突條件下取得空中優勢所需美軍聯隊數量
研究結果如圖2所示，這表明，和在台灣例子中一樣，美國空軍在2010年后几乎不可能在衝突初期就取得全天候制空權。但這一結果同樣也表明，即使是在2017年，美國仍可通過一場消耗戰獲勝。不過，對于將飛機部署到受威脅基地的需求仍在增加。
結論
美國繼續維持著舉世無雙的空對空作戰能力。即使在我們研究過的最具挑戰性的環境下，美國也沒有“輸掉”空中戰爭。但是，中國空中能力的持續進步仍讓美國在政治和軍事前提允許條件下奪得制空權的行動越來越困難。尤其是在接近中國大陸的地方。
[attach]118112163[/attach]
《國家利益》最新文章中認為，中國可能裝備200-300架第五代戰斗機，屆時局面會發生什麼變化還無法逆料
中國的發展同樣也增加了美國對中國戰爭需要付出的人員和裝備損失的代價。在兩場我們研究的戰役中，美國都可通過攻擊中國基地降低需要的部隊數量，降低中國參加戰斗的飛機數量。但是發動此類攻擊需要獲得行動許可，而且，看情況，這樣的攻擊命令也許永遠不會到來。因為這樣的攻擊很容易造成戰爭擴大。而且，如果美國攻擊中國基地，中國也可能攻擊美國基地，使用它數量龐大且精密的常規彈頭彈道導彈和巡航導彈。
總的來說，這一研究顯示的結果是，隨著中國空中力量的現代化，在衝突的初期階段取得制空權日益困難。因此，一旦衝突爆發，美國及其盟友的地面和海上部隊可能在一段時間內只能得到有限的空中支援。
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個人心得：有些時候不是爸爸不幫你們，而是他也無能為力啊。其實我倒是覺得，如果解放軍對台動武，台灣人還是祈禱美日別插手吧。如果美日不插手，國軍在第一時間投降，還可以保證台灣人最大程度的減少傷亡。一旦美日插手，不管最后誰輸誰贏，最慘的都一定是台灣人。
作者: freewillxlover 時間: 2017-3-20 11:53 PM
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作者: chunghanglin 時間: 2017-3-20 11:58 PM
本帖最後由 chunghanglin 於 2017-3-21 01:05 AM 編輯
哦!支那國好強哦..
那來啊,發動戰爭啊..
支那國本來也就準備把台灣人全殺光,即便美日不幫忙,台灣人還是會打到底
何況日本一定得幫,台日有共同的利害關係,不幫也不行,至於美國可以滾出亞洲了!!
當年要不要美國智障白豬壞事,台日早就完成東亞共榮了
[attach]118113200[/attach]
日本右翼..?連日本人都不是啊...國際法庭是各國法官組成的
睜眼嘴什麼瞎話啊
5名仲裁員簡介：
1. 首席仲裁員、加納籍法官門薩（Thomas Mensah）：
現年84歲，1996年至1999年出任國際海洋法法庭首屆庭長。門薩是知名國際海事專家，獲得眾多國際海事獎項及榮譽，參與過國際海洋法法庭的孟加拉與緬甸劃界案，以及在仲裁法院審議的孟加拉與印度海洋爭議。
2. 德國籍法官沃爾夫魯姆（Rudiger Wolfrum）：
1996年起擔任國際海洋法法庭法官，亦曾擔任門薩的副庭長，沃爾夫魯姆於2005年至2008年獲選為國際海洋法法庭庭長，現為德國國際法協會會長。他是菲方指定的仲裁員。
3. 波蘭籍法官帕夫拉克（Stanislaw Pawlak）：
由於中國拒絕參與仲裁，柳井俊二因此指派帕夫拉克作為中方仲裁員。他從2005年10月起成為國際海洋法法庭的成員，曾任波蘭駐聯合國大使，1985年曾率領波蘭代表團與前蘇聯談判海域劃界事宜。
4. 法國籍法官科特（Jean-Pierre Cot）：
曾是歐洲議會議員，2002年起為國際海洋法法庭法官，2008年至2011年任海洋環境爭端分庭（Chamber for Marine Environment Disputes）的庭長，也參與過國際法院多宗領土爭議及劃界案，如喀麥隆對尼日利亞的邊界糾紛、羅馬尼亞對烏克蘭的黑海劃界案等。
5. 荷蘭籍法官松斯（Alfred Soons）：
荷蘭烏得勒支大學國際法教授，曾任荷蘭國際法協會會長、荷蘭外交部公共國際法常設諮詢委員會主席。他曾參與「北極日出號」案的仲裁。
作者: chunghanglin 時間: 2017-3-21 12:00 AM
freewillxlover 發表於 2017-3-20 11:53 PM 
結論說得很對，沒有打不贏的戰爭，只有付不起的代價，如果自己只會用嘴巴打仗，又期待別人流血流汗來幫你， ...
沒錯,我們台灣人也該把核廢料都做成髒彈,台支戰爭時必須讓支那國付出最大的代價!!
作者: 阿可樂樂 時間: 2017-3-21 12:10 AM
由圖表可知, 美國依然可以獨自消滅中國的空軍戰力,
假使在台海, 若再加上台灣與日本的空軍, 中國毫無勝算.
樓主轉貼此文, 是替台灣人增強信心嗎?
作者: chunghanglin 時間: 2017-3-21 12:14 AM
阿可樂樂 發表於 2017-3-21 12:10 AM
由圖表可知, 美國依然可以獨自消滅中國的空軍戰力,
假使在台海, 若再加上台灣與日本的空軍, 中國毫無勝算 ...
這篇報告直接計算支那國跟美國發生戰爭的情況，可見美國已經開始準備跟支那國的戰爭了
這是好事
支那國不斷的向外侵略，戰爭早晚會來的，不如早點打一打
作者: 8079645 時間: 2017-3-21 12:19 AM
阿可樂樂 發表於 2017-3-21 12:10 AM
由圖表可知, 美國依然可以獨自消滅中國的空軍戰力,
假使在台海, 若再加上台灣與日本的空軍, 中國毫無勝算 ...
一看你的閱讀能力就有問題，沒辦法，台灣人的智商啊。
首先，上圖表示的是“參戰”的中國空中力量，簡而言之就是對台作戰的南部戰區和東部戰區所出動的空中力量，而非中國全部的空中力量。
再者，你有仔細閱讀過？文章中分析的殲滅參戰中國空中力量需要美國出動30個聯隊數量，而美國目前現役的戰斗機聯隊總數只有21個。看懂了麼？
智商堪憂
作者: revee1977 時間: 2017-3-21 12:26 AM
阿可樂樂 發表於 2017-3-21 12:10 AM
由圖表可知, 美國依然可以獨自消滅中國的空軍戰力,
假使在台海, 若再加上台灣與日本的空軍, 中國毫無勝算 ...
八戒:“論智慧和武功呢,我一直比他高一點點,可是現在多了一個紫霞仙子,他恐怕比我高一點點了!”
沙僧:“這邊有我嘛!”
八戒:“就是因為多了你這個累贅,他才會高我一點點“
應景啊！
作者: 阿可樂樂 時間: 2017-3-21 12:29 AM
本帖最後由 阿可樂樂 於 2017-3-21 12:31 AM 編輯
chunghanglin 發表於 2017-3-21 12:14 AM
這篇報告直接計算支那國跟美國發生戰爭的情況，可見美國已經開始準備跟支那國的戰爭了
這是好事
根據小弟長期觀察, 獨裁專制的國家, 為了對內宣傳, 往往軍事有五六分實力, 就吹牛到十分.
而美國擁有世界最強科技, 往往十分才說個五六分, 隱匿先進武器概念. 類似波灣戰爭, 伊拉克號稱世界第四強的軍隊, 一擊而潰. 世界, 包含美國人自己都嚇一跳.
美國兩次世界大戰, 都是扭轉戰局的關鍵參戰國. 未來真的發生戰爭, 只要和美國站在一起, 最後都是戰勝國. 損失自然可由戰後賠償獲得補充, 擔心中國侵台, 根本毫無道理.
作者: revee1977 時間: 2017-3-21 12:33 AM
本帖最後由 revee1977 於 2017-3-21 12:34 AM 編輯
阿可樂樂 發表於 2017-3-21 12:29 AM
根據小弟長期觀察, 獨裁專制的國家, 為了對內宣傳, 往往軍事有五六分實力, 就吹牛到十分.
而美國擁有世界 ...
“······紅色中國已經失去了最佳的參戰的時機
···現在不可能介入朝鮮戰爭···
我天天向上帝祈禱這一刻的來臨
······哪將是人類歷史上最大的屠殺···
感恩節前結束朝鮮戰爭···
聖誕節前結束朝鮮戰爭，讓孩子們回家···”
也應景啊
作者: 8079645 時間: 2017-3-21 12:35 AM
阿可樂樂 發表於 2017-3-21 12:29 AM
根據小弟長期觀察, 獨裁專制的國家, 為了對內宣傳, 往往軍事有五六分實力, 就吹牛到十分.
而美國擁有世 ...
不過很可惜啊，所向無敵的美國直接或間接參與到與中國有關的兩場戰爭，都搞得灰頭土臉。一個是朝鮮戰爭，一個是越南戰爭。一個是直接和解放軍對陣，一個是和經過解放軍武器支援和戰术訓練的越南軍隊對陣。就戰績而言，解放軍一直都是美國的克星。
再者，最重要的一點，你覺得美國會出于什麼目的寧可冒著本土被打擊，經濟衰退50年的風險來幫你打中國？
真是迷之自信啊
作者: McLean 時間: 2017-3-21 12:40 AM
既然如此，那為什麼中國還不趕快打？
怕甚麼？很明顯的中國賺到了不是嗎？
哈哈哈哈
作者: 阿可樂樂 時間: 2017-3-21 12:42 AM
本帖最後由 阿可樂樂 於 2017-3-21 12:44 AM 編輯
8079645 發表於 2017-3-21 12:19 AM
一看你的閱讀能力就有問題，沒辦法，台灣人的智商啊。
首先，上圖表示的是“參戰”的中國空中力量，簡而 ...
圖表中很清楚, 美國獨自消滅中國參戰的50%空軍, 7天內只需要7個聯隊啊.
台海發生戰爭, 難道台灣與日本的戰機會都在睡覺嗎? 顯然是低於7個聯隊, 是您看不懂, 還是小弟看錯?
作者: chunghanglin 時間: 2017-3-21 12:43 AM
revee1977 發表於 2017-3-21 12:33 AM
“······紅色中國已經失去了最佳的參戰的時機
···現在不可能介入朝鮮戰爭···
我天天向上帝祈 ...
你看看你..氣喘噓噓的^^
不是嘴什麼底氣足..
蘭德報告才稍微概估一下美支戰爭,心靈就受不了了嗎..
堅強點啦
作者: chunghanglin 時間: 2017-3-21 12:45 AM
8079645 發表於 2017-3-21 12:35 AM
不過很可惜啊，所向無敵的美國直接或間接參與到與中國有關的兩場戰爭，都搞得灰頭土臉。一個是朝鮮戰爭， ...
越戰是越南人打的!!
韓國,支那軍隊偽裝成北韓軍,結果被美國打到龜回去..
精神勝利法真的沒下限了嗎..
作者: dkdsl 時間: 2017-3-21 12:48 AM
本帖最後由 dkdsl 於 2017-3-21 12:48 AM 編輯
這個篇報導論點只能用無知來形容~
因為戰機需要空中與地面的導航與戰術引導作戰~以台灣的空域南北400公里~來算能容納多少戰機?有多少人可以導引作戰?
當然老美若是以全面入侵大陸的方式作戰~這2000架是不夠用~
但若是以單純防衛台灣而言~100架F22就夠嗆死老共了~
作者: 8079645 時間: 2017-3-21 12:49 AM
阿可樂樂 發表於 2017-3-21 12:42 AM
圖表中很清楚, 美國獨自消滅中國參戰的50%空軍, 7天內只需要7個聯隊啊.
那麼到時候, 台灣與日本的戰機會 ...
首先，你知道美國在亞太部署的戰斗機聯隊總共有多少麼？
東部戰區和南部戰區的空中力量大約占中國空軍總數的50%，而這兩個戰區50%的空中力量大概相當于中國全部空中力量的1/4。而你知道7個聯隊是什麼概念麼？美國整整1/3的空中力量。
也就是說，在中國家門口殲滅中國1/4的空中力量需要美國付出1/3空中力量的代價。看懂了麼？
跟智商低的人說話實在是頭疼
補充內容 (2017-3-21 12:51 AM):
補充一下，不是我看不起台灣和日本，只是和中美相比，台日的空軍基本可以忽略不計了
作者: revee1977 時間: 2017-3-21 12:51 AM
chunghanglin 發表於 2017-3-21 12:43 AM
你看看你..氣喘噓噓的^^
不是嘴什麼底氣足..
阿可樂樂和那位什麼礁，是論壇的一時瑜亮，奇葩兩朵，逗起來也很有意思。
至于你則是奇葩中極品，還沒有可媲美的。對你我們是直接抽了。
對于樂樂我們才找几句應景的台詞，這是對你的智商歧視，雖然略有不公，但也只能如此了。
作者: revee1977 時間: 2017-3-21 12:55 AM
dkdsl 發表於 2017-3-21 12:48 AM
這個篇報導論點只能用無知來形容~
因為戰機需要空中與地面的導航與戰術引導作戰~以台灣的空域南北400公里~ ...
全球才180多架，好家伙台海來100架，真是親爹啊
作者: 阿可樂樂 時間: 2017-3-21 12:57 AM
本帖最後由 阿可樂樂 於 2017-3-21 12:59 AM 編輯
8079645 發表於 2017-3-21 12:35 AM
不過很可惜啊，所向無敵的美國直接或間接參與到與中國有關的兩場戰爭，都搞得灰頭土臉。一個是朝鮮戰爭， ...
越戰中國並未參戰, 別往自己臉上貼金. 至於韓戰, 中國可以用人命來填, 中國侵台打的會是海空戰役, 解放軍是要游泳過來打嗎?
至於本土攻擊, 當年杜魯門拒絕麥克阿瑟的建議~用核武器在鴨綠江沿岸, 轟炸出一個核汙染走廊, 阻止中國後續軍隊.
真要打本土打擊戰, 美國無論傳統武器或核武, 大概都可以把北京轟炸數百次, 您猜誰怕誰?
作者: chunghanglin 時間: 2017-3-21 12:58 AM
revee1977 發表於 2017-3-21 12:51 AM
阿可樂樂和那位什麼礁，是論壇的一時瑜亮，奇葩兩朵，逗起來也很有意思。
至于你則是奇葩中極品，還沒有 ...
你一個連美軍仁川登陸時支那解放軍偽裝的北韓軍在哪都搞不清楚的人...在嘴什麼??
唸書先吧?
作者: revee1977 時間: 2017-3-21 01:01 AM
chunghanglin 發表於 2017-3-21 12:58 AM
你一個連美軍仁川登陸時支那解放軍偽裝的北韓軍在哪都搞不清楚的人...在嘴什麼??
唸書先吧?
仁川登陸時，解放軍偽裝的北韓？呵呵。小丑又開始表演了。你干脆說金日成也是解放軍好了，畢竟也參加過抗聯。不過給你上歷史課沒必要，我們還是看小丑表演吧
作者: 礁溪伊莉 時間: 2017-3-21 01:02 AM
提示: 作者被禁止或刪除 內容自動屏蔽
作者: 阿可樂樂 時間: 2017-3-21 01:03 AM
8079645 發表於 2017-3-21 12:49 AM
首先，你知道美國在亞太部署的戰斗機聯隊總共有多少麼？
東部戰區和南部戰區的空中力量大約占中國空軍總 ...
台海發生戰爭, 您還把台日空軍忽略不計?? 這明顯違反現實啊.
作者: revee1977 時間: 2017-3-21 01:06 AM
礁溪伊莉 發表於 2017-3-21 01:02 AM
一篇很白癡的,
大陸官媒自慰文章~....
《國家利益》啥時候被中共收購了，真是天下無人不通共啊
作者: 8079645 時間: 2017-3-21 01:07 AM
阿可樂樂 發表於 2017-3-21 12:57 AM
越戰中國並未參戰, 別往自己臉上貼金. 至於韓戰, 中國可以用人命來填, 中國侵台打的會是海空戰役, 解放軍 ...
越戰時中國的確沒有參戰，但當時中越正處在蜜月期，越南軍裝備的武器几乎都是中國支援的，且越南軍隊的訓練也是解放軍指導的，這一點無可否認。
再者，越南是個和中美兩國都打過仗的國家，用越南來衡量中美當時的戰术水平還是很合適的。美國打越南整整打了14年，而解放軍只用了一個月時間就占領了河內。這還是在當時中蘇交惡，中國70%的裝甲力量都部署在中蘇邊境牽制蘇聯的情況下。
而朝鮮戰爭，中國剛剛經歷了抗日戰爭和解放戰爭，滿目瘡痍的情況下依然把17國聯軍一路從鴨綠江推回三八線。我們窮困潦倒的時候都沒鳥過美國，現在還會怕一個衰落中的美國？
你們這些把生死命運都寄托在別人身上，自己對命運毫無把控能力的台灣人，實在是悲哀
作者: 8079645 時間: 2017-3-21 01:10 AM
礁溪伊莉 發表於 2017-3-21 01:02 AM
一篇很白癡的,
大陸官媒自慰文章~....
抱歉，這是美國蘭德公司的研究題目，翻譯自美國《國家利益》雜志，可以自行去谷歌原版
作者: 8079645 時間: 2017-3-21 01:14 AM
阿可樂樂 發表於 2017-3-21 01:03 AM
台海發生戰爭, 您還把台日空軍忽略不計?? 這明顯違反現實啊.
等日本購買的F35形成建制再提威脅吧，現在靠他們那老到快飛不起來的F15，看著都可憐。希望安倍修憲之路再加把勁。
至于台灣，你們那二代半戰機IDF。。。。是要把教主掛上去來實現超音速巡航嗎？
作者: revee1977 時間: 2017-3-21 01:15 AM
[attach]118113258[/attach]
這種估算，蘭德几乎每年做一次，等上面這張記分表，所有項目都變成橙色，甚至出現紅色時，就是兩岸統一的時間。我一直也說了，二十年內吧。
不用著急，還有時間
作者: 阿可樂樂 時間: 2017-3-21 01:15 AM
8079645 發表於 2017-3-21 01:07 AM
越戰時中國的確沒有參戰，但當時中越正處在蜜月期，越南軍裝備的武器几乎都是中國支援的，且越南軍隊的訓 ...
您談的這些, 是屬於歷史事實的資訊閱讀與個人解讀, 小弟沒有意見.
不過真的發生戰爭, 以歷史事實與目前美國的國力, 與美國站在一起, 台灣大概不會吃虧.
作者: chunghanglin 時間: 2017-3-21 01:17 AM
revee1977 發表於 2017-3-21 01:01 AM
仁川登陸時，解放軍偽裝的北韓？呵呵。小丑又開始表演了。你干脆說金日成也是解放軍好了，畢竟也參加過抗 ...
1949年，金日成奔走於莫斯科和北京間要求合夥發動戰爭「解放」韓國，在金日成再三要求下，中國人民解放軍四野林彪部隊總算將中國籍朝鮮族的三個精銳師在1949和1950年初調入北韓，編入朝鮮人民軍，供金日成調遣，是金日成進攻韓國的主力部隊。
本來侵略南韓的就是支那國的軍隊，雖然支那解放軍盡力的偽裝成北韓人民軍..
首先你要搞清楚,美國的戰略從頭到尾都是把支那豬打回38度線..
支那國的戰略目的是幫助北韓消滅南韓,再後支那國再掌握朝鮮半島!!可惜被美國打碎了幻想..
順便一提,支那人也敢感謝美國,如果不是美國把毛二世給打死了,現在支那國可能就是毛三胖在當家^^
作者: chunghanglin 時間: 2017-3-21 01:18 AM
8079645 發表於 2017-3-21 01:07 AM
越戰時中國的確沒有參戰，但當時中越正處在蜜月期，越南軍裝備的武器几乎都是中國支援的，且越南軍隊的訓 ...
刀神擁有一把刀跟你擁有一把刀一樣嗎?
就算給你f22你會開嘛你...
人的素質呢,是最重要的!!
懂嗎?
作者: 8079645 時間: 2017-3-21 01:21 AM
阿可樂樂 發表於 2017-3-21 01:15 AM
您談的這些, 是屬於歷史事實的資訊閱讀與個人解讀, 小弟沒有意見.
不過真的發生戰爭, 以歷史事實與目前 ...
首先，如果中國和美國直接爆發衝突，你們主動請纓給美國當炮灰沒人介意。
但你指望中國統一台灣的時候美國來幫你們打，恐怕是想多了。
要知道伊拉克，烏克蘭，敘利亞，甚至本拉登都曾經是美國盟友，然而結果呢？
更何況你們連美國的盟友都不是，美國人甚至都不肯承認你們的國格。
是什麼讓你認為美國會拼死保衛台灣？
作者: ficooool 時間: 2017-3-21 01:23 AM
阿可樂樂 發表於 2017-3-21 12:10 AM
由圖表可知, 美國依然可以獨自消滅中國的空軍戰力,
假使在台海, 若再加上台灣與日本的空軍, 中國毫無勝算 ...
日本用F35嗎？還是心神？
台灣用直升機懟大陸固定翼嗎？還是用閹割版幻影？
原來有F16呀！
作者: ficooool 時間: 2017-3-21 01:24 AM
McLean 發表於 2017-3-21 12:40 AM
既然如此，那為什麼中國還不趕快打？
怕甚麼？很明顯的中國賺到了不是嗎？
豬要養肥了再殺。
作者: ficooool 時間: 2017-3-21 01:30 AM
阿可樂樂 發表於 2017-3-21 01:15 AM
您談的這些, 是屬於歷史事實的資訊閱讀與個人解讀, 小弟沒有意見.
不過真的發生戰爭, 以歷史事實與目前 ...
台灣被美國坑的精神也不正常了。
作者: chunghanglin 時間: 2017-3-21 01:33 AM
8079645 發表於 2017-3-21 01:21 AM
首先，如果中國和美國直接爆發衝突，你們主動請纓給美國當炮灰沒人介意。
但你指望中國統一台灣的時候美 ...
伊拉克，烏克蘭，敘利亞..是美國的軍事領地嗎??
可是台灣是美國的軍事領地耶..
美國本來就不承認中華民國殖民政府擁有台灣的主權,這沒什麼好嘴的吧?
作者: 阿可樂樂 時間: 2017-3-21 01:37 AM
本帖最後由 阿可樂樂 於 2017-3-21 01:42 AM 編輯
8079645 發表於 2017-3-21 01:14 AM
等日本購買的F35形成建制再提威脅吧，現在靠他們那老到快飛不起來的F15，看著都可憐。希望安倍修憲之路再 ...
假如您對台灣, 甚至日本的空軍實力, 真的如此認為, 那小弟只好舉雙手投降, 不知要怎麼談下去?
台灣媒體透明, 個人也曾建議殲20來繞台. 國民黨還有近1/3的立委席次, 台灣親中媒體也很多, 每天對華的親善宣傳不少, 置入性文宣也多不勝數.
假如殲20, 台軍真的抓不到, 不用北京出手, 在野黨與上述媒體, 他們有自己的消息管道, 就會在國會砲轟, 再加上媒體追殺, 台灣現實環境如此.
真的假不了, 假的也真不了. 台華能保持對話, 依循某些事實上存在的政治默契, 持續有利於雙方發展的和平環境, 當然是上上的選擇.
只是真的要硬幹, 台灣也不怕什麼. 畢竟國家的生存, 與每個人在社會的發展, 可以類比. 靠的都是真實的努力與實力, 從來不是畏縮與恐懼.
作者: 8079645 時間: 2017-3-21 02:01 AM
阿可樂樂 發表於 2017-3-21 01:37 AM
假如您對台灣, 甚至日本的空軍實力, 真的如此認為, 那小弟只好舉雙手投降, 不知要怎麼談下去?
台灣媒體透 ...
然而日本的空中力量的確就是如此，我不過是說的比較直白而已。日本對中國能造成一定威脅的，只有其海上力量。空軍和陸軍，一直都是戰而后日本軍事實力的短板。
至于台灣媒体有多透明暫且不論，光是其造假水平就已經很給媒体界丟人了。如果閣下到現在還認為J20是個塞電池的玩具模型，神州航天計划是水下拍攝的，那我也只能無言以對了。
關于戰爭，我想從沒有經歷過戰爭的台灣是沒有發言權的。這個世界已經几十年沒經歷過戰爭了。
中東地區那不叫戰爭，別把衝突和動亂當做戰爭。
什麼是戰爭？一個國家，一個民族，一個種族為了生存和延續所爆發出來的瘋狂。大到文明的毀滅，小到人的價值被徹底否認，那種絕望，沒經歷過是不會懂得。
不知道你們台灣有沒有經歷過二戰活下來的老人？你見過他們提及那段過往時的眼神麼？我見過，而且見過很多。有時間去看一看他們的眼神，保證你一輩子都忘不了
作者: 阿可樂樂 時間: 2017-3-21 02:10 AM
8079645 發表於 2017-3-21 01:21 AM
首先，如果中國和美國直接爆發衝突，你們主動請纓給美國當炮灰沒人介意。
但你指望中國統一台灣的時候美 ...
台灣人什麼時候[主動請纓給美國當炮灰]? 這是違反歷史現實的.
台美合作, 是因為台灣抗統自保與美國在亞太的戰略布局, 國家利益一致.
美國二戰在太平洋戰爭中獲勝, 中國也才因此側身戰勝國之列. 美國不但沒有趁機佔有南海、東海、台灣諸島, 還讓美屬菲律賓公投獨立, 事實上美國讓所有海外屬地住民公投, 自行決定國家歸屬.
今天實際的戰勝國都沒佔有的地方, 而沾美國之光勉強號稱戰勝的中國, 現在想把她們吞下去, 個人認為那是一種幻想. 而對照當前世界國力, 美國相對尤勝於二戰之後. 是以中國想想可以, 但做, 大概是做不到吧.
作者: 阿可樂樂 時間: 2017-3-21 02:29 AM
8079645 發表於 2017-3-21 02:01 AM
然而日本的空中力量的確就是如此，我不過是說的比較直白而已。日本對中國能造成一定威脅的，只有其海上力 ...
戰爭的慘烈, 聽聽長輩們的論述, 小弟很清楚, 至少對1945美軍對日轟炸的各地慘狀, 例如東京、大阪、名古屋, 有些深刻的了解.
但是, 中國要打台灣, 台灣人會死, 中國人也一樣會死, 恐嚇是沒有用的. 真要翻臉, 大家就是看實力, 真要野蠻, 那就是比拳頭, 與美日站在一起的台灣, 不會怕中國什麼.
作者: 017706 時間: 2017-3-21 03:53 AM
一切都是補給線的問題
那假如中國要打美國那戰力評估又如何
作者: revee1977 時間: 2017-3-21 08:36 AM
017706 發表於 2017-3-21 03:53 AM
一切都是補給線的問題
那假如中國要打美國那戰力評估又如何
本來就是基于台海，放心好了，大陸沒有興趣去打美國本土
作者: 白蓮梵天 時間: 2017-3-21 08:42 AM
大陸的軍力如果是像中東那種阿貓阿狗的
美國老早就開戰了
作者: 田梆梆 時間: 2017-3-21 08:49 AM
阿可樂樂 發表於 2017-3-21 12:10 AM
由圖表可知, 美國依然可以獨自消滅中國的空軍戰力,
假使在台海, 若再加上台灣與日本的空軍, 中國毫無勝算 ...
這個好，鼓勵台灣信心，不然中國就是只知道從身心打擊台灣，以為把台灣黑下去中國捧上來，台灣就會更願意被統一似的。
作者: vvikimo 時間: 2017-3-21 09:35 AM
國力相差太多，
比較也沒意義。
中國的競爭對手是美國，
有分裂問題的是大陸內部而不是台灣。
台灣的民主自由發展以後一定會影響中國，
這是台灣對於華人最棒的貢獻。
作者: 礁溪伊莉 時間: 2017-3-21 10:43 AM
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作者: hhoe876181 時間: 2017-3-21 11:23 AM
那麼多人在說美國有多強,中國有多爛
總而言之
只要戰爭,台灣永遠是傷害最大的
二個強國在台灣打的天昏地暗時
難道有人認為,你可以開心出門逛街,安心在家看電視吃飯
然後可以一直罵政府爛罵到嘴累都不會有人敲門捉你
醒醒吧,只要戰爭,台灣直接就淪為最窮困最不自由的國家
不管最後是中國還是美國勝利,台灣只有等著被宰割的命運
作者: chunghanglin 時間: 2017-3-21 12:00 PM
hhoe876181 發表於 2017-3-21 11:23 AM
那麼多人在說美國有多強,中國有多爛
總而言之
只要戰爭,台灣永遠是傷害最大的
二估強國？
只有美國是強國好吧．．
支那國連飛機的發動機都搞不定是要用什麼跟美國對打？用嘴炮把f22射下來?
作者: chunghanglin 時間: 2017-3-21 12:02 PM
白蓮梵天 發表於 2017-3-21 08:42 AM
大陸的軍力如果是像中東那種阿貓阿狗的
美國老早就開戰了
支那的戰力是像中東一樣阿貓阿狗沒錯
美國是考量到支那難民才沒動手的
不過其實美國也不用想太多,把支那核平也就不會有什麼難民了
作者: 楓露茶香_ 時間: 2017-3-21 12:03 PM
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作者: evilmage8436 時間: 2017-3-21 12:19 PM
政府沒打算協防啊 ...
政府打算發展飛彈軍好嗎 ...
來對射啊 支啊
作者: bushfire 時間: 2017-3-21 02:06 PM
老美當初給錢給武器給糧食
不是照樣打不過中國
現在怎麼能打得過
作者: manchuhou 時間: 2017-3-21 03:55 PM
都是空談，美國是否願意上陣還是個未知數呢。
作者: kuku918 時間: 2017-3-21 04:18 PM
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作者: 021217 時間: 2017-3-21 04:22 PM
本帖最後由 021217 於 2017-3-21 04:22 PM 編輯
阿可樂樂 發表於 2017-3-21 12:29 AM
根據小弟長期觀察, 獨裁專制的國家, 為了對內宣傳, 往往軍事有五六分實力, 就吹牛到十分.
而美國擁有世界 ...
半個世紀前，所有民主美國擁有十分實力，也吹成十三分說用3個月能解決朝鮮，閃電解決越南。
結果呢，呵呵。我就默默的笑你好了。
中美已經打過幾次，美國有嬴一次?
半個世紀過去了，現在中美沒看出有開戰的可能性，你就這樣出來呱燥?
有夠低能的，還美國作為世界最強科技，打個中亞都打不下來，哈。
美國作為世界最強科技，在未來電子、電磁、激光、衛星卻一次又一次被中國沖擊，
你以為還是拼航母戰機的時代啊?
美國衛星群的三個支援點打下一個，全部戰機都得變盲，所有導彈引導得變用肉眼引導，
這是美國自己都承認的事實。
當然美國肯定也會攻擊回中國的北斗衛星群，那麼，一起瞎啊，
來拼人數，來拼地域跟補及優勢啊，
看看美國跟當年的麥可斯所做的戰果會差多少?
你這種發言根本腦殘，還長期觀察，觀你老母啦觀。
作者: hayden2010 時間: 2017-3-21 04:27 PM
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作者: chunghanglin 時間: 2017-3-21 04:33 PM
hayden2010 發表於 2017-3-21 04:27 PM
美國是强國不粗啊， 但是你們只是美國的狗啊，美軍不知道會不會為了自己的狗而全力戰斗，畢竟台灣跟日 ...
台灣是美國的軍事領地中華民國殖民下的奴隷這是事實不能否認的
但是，支那國也是俄爸的肉便廁！俄爸丟垃圾尿尿的地方
台灣從美國那裡拿武器，支那國一樣也從他俄爸那裡求武器
作者: 021217 時間: 2017-3-21 04:36 PM
本帖最後由 021217 於 2017-3-21 04:39 PM 編輯
chunghanglin 發表於 2017-3-21 12:58 AM
你一個連美軍仁川登陸時支那解放軍偽裝的北韓軍在哪都搞不清楚的人...在嘴什麼??
唸書先吧?
你根本就是戰史盲，越戰如果不是中國作為北越最大的支持者，美國會敗得那麼慘，
敗到連中美在沒有建交下都不得不去訪問中國?
看你就是沒出過台灣，有機會拜託你先去美國黃石公園去看看越戰紀念碑，
看看美國當年的傳媒是怎樣評論這場越戰是怎樣評論當時的中共，好嗎?
說話不要笑出國際。
還有如果越南是超人，後面中國79年用1個月就占領完畢並宣布勝利，
超人呢? 回去87星啦?
在美國戰爭史上，蘇聯是假想敵，而中共是他們的痛，也只有中國是他們承認過失敗的錯誤!
曾經的將軍布來德利就對中共說了一句: Frankly,in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,this strategy would involve us in the wrong war,at the wrong place,at the wrong time,and with the wrong enemy.
知不知道是甚麼意思啊，不知道就去翻譚吧腦殘!
作者: hayden2010 時間: 2017-3-21 04:41 PM
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作者: chunghanglin 時間: 2017-3-21 04:53 PM
021217 發表於 2017-3-21 04:36 PM
你根本就是戰史盲，越戰如果不是中國作為北越最大的支持者，美國會敗得那麼慘，
敗到連中美在沒有建交下都 ...
你是戰史文盲嗎？？
就算你都不唸內容，看到越戰二個字也該知道那是越南打的吧？
原話不敢貼出只敢斷章取義是哪招？-.-而且這句是韓戰的時候講的
Red China is not the powerful nation seeking to dominate the world. Frankly, in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this strategy would involve us in the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy.
會翻譯嗎?自己翻翻看!!支那很弱的..美國也沒把支那當對手
作者: chunghanglin 時間: 2017-3-21 04:56 PM
hayden2010 發表於 2017-3-21 04:41 PM
哎，你這意淫的真是好笑， 大陸跟台灣不同的就是我們從來不用看任何人臉色， 可以跟前蘇聯翻臉， 也可 ...
對啊！支那國也一定要看俄爸的臉色啊
啊不然支那國的飛機就不能飛上天囉^^
嘴很邱,但是還是要跟俄爸求發動機
作者: 021217 時間: 2017-3-21 05:02 PM
本帖最後由 021217 於 2017-3-21 05:05 PM 編輯
chunghanglin 發表於 2017-3-21 04:53 PM
你是戰史文盲嗎？？
就算你都不唸內容，看到越戰二個字也該知道那是越南打的吧？
呵呵，反正你就是腦殘，那句英文你翻來看看啊，那一句是美國沒把支那當對手?
你連英語都弱成如此，還談戰史?? 還談越戰美國失敗關鍵??
看到is not the powerful? 就代表是說支那很弱，難怪台灣的教育越來越差。
"Red China is not the powerful nation seeking to dominate the world"
是指中共(ReD=共產黨)並不是追求統冶世界的強國啊，腦子夠殘!!
知道是怎麼翻嗎?
Red China is not/ the powerful nation seeking to dominate the world
那個is not不是指the powerful nation，而是seeking to dominate the world，
低B，你英文邊度學的? 爛成這樣難怪看史書都看反，說出來也腦殘。
再重申一下，沒腦沒本事別亂說，免得笑出國際。
唉，不行，我要貼出去給身邊人看，居然有人把這句話看成中國是弱國，而且還想反嘲，笑尿了。
台灣大學在Times Rank一年比一年低不是沒理由的，哈哈。
作者: chunghanglin 時間: 2017-3-21 05:36 PM
本帖最後由 chunghanglin 於 2017-3-21 05:39 PM 編輯
021217 發表於 2017-3-21 05:02 PM
呵呵，反正你就是腦殘，那句英文你翻來看看啊，那一句是美國沒把支那當對手?
你連英語都弱成如此，還談戰 ...
整句就是沒把支那當對手啊!!
所以說支那教育都是些自慰教育...
好可憐...
支那並不是追求統冶世界的強國啊．．．你自己翻的吧？你自己也都說不是了，所以美國不把支那當成對手，是確定的吧！
很顯然的,支那很弱,所以美國不把支那當成對手...蠻明顯的吧?
支那本來就是弱國,你怎麼嘴都好!?^^當年還是靠美國才救了小支那國一命,啊不然早就被大日本帝國的日台聯軍給打死了..
強在哪?強在你的嘴炮!!!?
支那國的架空幻想史很愛往自己臉上貼金，美國的對手是俄羅斯啊！
支那國真的不要越級挑戰，越支戰爭，支那國趁越南國內空虛不宣而戰,結果還是慘敗收場，這個鳥實力還想挑戰美國..搞笑?
作者: 陳立軒君 時間: 2017-3-21 05:43 PM
chunghanglin 發表於 2017-3-20 11:58 PM
哦!支那國好強哦..
那來啊,發動戰爭啊..
美國再怎麼強悍，也是臨局來到地主國跟地主國打架，縱使美國最終能打敗中國，但是美國也要損失不少，到底會不會拿到實質好處呢?我的答案是否定的，當擁核國家被逼迫到最危及的時候就會爆發核子戰爭，目前對於彈道飛彈攔截的技術確實美國在美伊戰爭得到了很好的參數，但是還是要用更多的反彈道飛彈才能攔截到一枚彈道飛彈，如果中國擁有10000枚飛彈，美國至少要她的數量至少多一倍以上才比較有保障。
戰爭不是兒戲，打了就是拼死命的打的消耗戰，受苦的還是全世界的人
作者: 021217 時間: 2017-3-21 05:48 PM
本帖最後由 021217 於 2017-3-21 05:48 PM 編輯
chunghanglin 發表於 2017-3-21 05:36 PM
整句就是沒把支那當對手啊!!
所以說支那教育都是些自慰教育...
哈哈哈哈，不說了，台灣腦殘真多，你覺得我自己翻的可以GOOGLE，維基都有原文翻譯可查，這都不信可以拿去reddit開PO問啊，不過老外回你怕你看不懂。
記得找到有說是"沒把中國當成對手"的出處PO一下。
笑死了，這種水平，XD，超垃圾的
作者: chunghanglin 時間: 2017-3-21 05:57 PM
021217 發表於 2017-3-21 05:48 PM
哈哈哈哈，不說了，台灣腦殘真多，你覺得我自己翻的可以GOOGLE，維基都有原文翻譯可查，這都不信可以拿去r ...
討論越戰,你貼上韓戰的東東,誰垃圾啊??
支那很弱這是事實的嘛!!
美國沒把支那當成對手也是事實的嘛!!
你想用嘴炮篡改歷史哦..難哦
作者: chunghanglin 時間: 2017-3-21 06:01 PM
陳立軒君 發表於 2017-3-21 05:43 PM
美國再怎麼強悍，也是臨局來到地主國跟地主國打架，縱使美國最終能打敗中國，但是美國也要損失不少，到底 ...
美國損失了什麼??支那國根本沒能力攻擊到美國...是要損失什麼?
開戰的瞬間,支那國的肥斗慰星就被擊落了啦
現代戰爭最恐怖的地方就是大規模的毀滅,美國完全有能力把支那國從地球上移除..支那國卻沒有美國的皮條
作者: snake010 時間: 2017-3-21 06:11 PM
這樣的新聞真是讓人覺得激勵!
作者: 021217 時間: 2017-3-21 06:12 PM
本帖最後由 021217 於 2017-3-21 06:26 PM 編輯
chunghanglin 發表於 2017-3-21 05:57 PM
討論越戰,你貼上韓戰的東東,誰垃圾啊??
支那很弱這是事實的嘛!!
我有跟你說要討論越戰嗎? 這個PO是說越戰嗎?你知道美國從那次空炸就被評為失敗之始嗎?
我只是說你是個戰史盲，你的美國爸爸一直就輸給中共，
而越戰不是靠甚麼越南超人，而是背後有中國再支撐，
而美國戰史上，也就中國是美國承認過的錯誤跟失敗，
這是國際都知道的歷史，我貼那句就是一個例子，
你覺得越戰是越南自己戰勝美國隨便你，被人笑死罷了，
一個被中國一個月就打敗的國家，
卻能打嬴你認為必嬴中國的美國用了10幾年都只能敗走的，
哇，誰嘴炮啊，屌你老母，真係腦殘是你家族遺傳嗎?
而且，你連那句英文都能翻得如此腦殘，
你有甚麼學問嗎? 你連英文文法都看不懂，
你能看懂外國人紀錄的歷史嗎?
超笑話了好不好，你就一個沒本事只能嘴炮中國的垃圾，
除了EYNY也沒別的地方你能發洩各種怨天怨地怨支那，
台灣就你這種水平最多，沒技術，沒學問，沒能力，
就是一只井底之蛙，
對，美國很強，所以台蛙就稱爸爸，更覺得不能取勝的，
連嘴都不敢嘴，
中國很弱，卻能打得美國屁滾尿，打得蘇聯坦克都得丟，
台灣呢? 從國民就剩嘴炮嘴到現在，
像你就只能在EYNY不斷嘴，
又怎樣，中國復興是全世界都知道的事實，
你能咬一口啊，
你一邊嘴中國，卻連英文都那麼垃圾，
怎跟老外說中國支那啥啥啥?
所以你就只能呆在台灣上EYNY自嘴自樂，呵呵。
作者: 021217 時間: 2017-3-21 06:14 PM
chunghanglin 發表於 2017-3-21 05:57 PM
討論越戰,你貼上韓戰的東東,誰垃圾啊??
支那很弱這是事實的嘛!!
講真，你老母生到你咁撚垃圾，無本事只有上EYNY嘴中國大陸，
你老豆屌你老母果陣知唔知? 真係ON撚尻尻，一味9UP以為自己派秘笈，
成個白痴仔，同香港廢青一撚樣。
作者: 陳立軒君 時間: 2017-3-21 06:18 PM
chunghanglin 發表於 2017-3-21 06:01 PM
美國損失了什麼??支那國根本沒能力攻擊到美國...是要損失什麼?
開戰的瞬間,支那國的肥斗慰星就被擊落了 ...
當美國開戰的時候，俄羅斯也不會坐視不管，畢竟唇亡齒寒，而且利用互相牽制的方法或是間接干擾的方法來增加中美的損耗比，從中得利。
作者: chunghanglin 時間: 2017-3-21 06:25 PM
021217 發表於 2017-3-21 06:12 PM
我有跟你說要討論越戰嗎? 這個PO是說越戰嗎?你知道美國從那次空炸就被評為失敗之始嗎?
我只是說你是個戰 ...
021217 發表於 2017-3-21 04:36 PM
你根本就是戰史盲，越戰如果不是中國作為北越最大的支持者，美國會敗得那麼慘，
敗到連中美在沒有建交下都 ...
自己嘴出來的東東,馬上就自己翻掉了??
可憐啊...
越戰,美國沒有打輸,是國內的局勢改變了美國的作風.人道主義跟反戰主義讓美國撤出越南,啊不然美國完全的把越南人壓著打好吧??
支那國不敢對美國宣戰,只敢用什麼志願軍自慰軍的去偷打,還想收割戰果,這只證明了支那國就是東亞病夫而已..
越支戰爭是越南打贏支那,這誰都知道的啊!!支那國不宣而戰偷襲越南,越南軍隊一回師便叫支那鬼子連滾帶爬的逃跑!!
你看你氣喘噓噓罵啊罵的,這樣子就有用?!沒用的..這改變不了支那國根本嫩的事實
作者: chunghanglin 時間: 2017-3-21 06:28 PM
陳立軒君 發表於 2017-3-21 06:18 PM
當美國開戰的時候，俄羅斯也不會坐視不管，畢竟唇亡齒寒，而且利用互相牽制的方法或是間接干擾的方法來增 ...
美國完全有實力單幹俄羅斯把支那二個國家
人道主義跟反戰主義在主導美國而已！！
再說俄羅斯會挺支那國？
好好笑哦...
俄羅斯會趁機偷襲支那國的,俄支的領土爭議還沒結束呢
作者: brook2006s 時間: 2017-3-21 06:34 PM
精美圖文卻是空洞到跟白癡依樣 美國精銳盡出 幹嘛 要中國乖乖旁邊看 插手的話立刻攻打中國 一石二鳥
作者: 021217 時間: 2017-3-21 06:45 PM
chunghanglin 發表於 2017-3-21 06:25 PM
自己嘴出來的東東,馬上就自己翻掉了??
可憐啊...
我覺得你腦殘的好可憐，你現實是不是像條狗?
關於越戰，外國多間機構以及文書都有了分曉，
這是一場美國又一次對外地區平衡的失敗，
代理戰爭失敗的結果，亦是美國對外有限戰中的極限，
這些都不需要你一個台巴子來呱燥。
你這種心態根本有病，去看看醫生吧，無能不要怪在中國身上，
要怪就怪你老母生了腦殘的你。
作者: 陳立軒君 時間: 2017-3-21 06:45 PM
chunghanglin 發表於 2017-3-21 06:28 PM
美國完全有實力單幹俄羅斯把支那二個國家
人道主義跟反戰主義在主導美國而已！！
這也是很難說，因為太早讓中國拖垮，反而會不利於俄羅斯，畢竟俄羅斯在世界上的盟友不算多，敵人的敵認識朋友是可以利用的，不過中國快不行的時候，俄國當然會大力幫忙阿，不過那個代價可能會很高而已
一個國家再怎麼強悍，也無法避免核子戰爭的爆發，不要忘記前蘇聯的底氣還是有，人總是不記取戰爭的教訓
作者: 西岸的来打酱油 時間: 2017-3-21 07:38 PM
礁溪伊莉 發表於 2017-3-21 01:02 AM
一篇很白癡的,
大陸官媒自慰文章~....
中國官媒？
你要不要google一下蘭德公司？
作者: 礁溪伊莉 時間: 2017-3-21 08:08 PM
提示: 作者被禁止或刪除 內容自動屏蔽
作者: bukk2007921 時間: 2017-3-21 08:42 PM
台灣人也不是省油的燈
大陸別再想吃台灣人的豆腐了
作者: chunghanglin 時間: 2017-3-21 09:06 PM
021217 發表於 2017-3-21 06:45 PM
我覺得你腦殘的好可憐，你現實是不是像條狗?
關於越戰，外國多間機構以及文書都有了分曉，
支那豬都是腦殘吧??
越戰又不是支那國打的在那邊嘴..
這只是在證明支那人就是東亞病夫而已!!
越南都敢對美國宣戰,就支那國不敢,只能派什麼志願軍躲起來偷打不承認,傻乎乎的東亞弱智病夫
作者: chunghanglin 時間: 2017-3-21 09:08 PM
陳立軒君 發表於 2017-3-21 06:45 PM
這也是很難說，因為太早讓中國拖垮，反而會不利於俄羅斯，畢竟俄羅斯在世界上的盟友不算多，敵人的敵認識 ...
支那快不行的時候，俄羅斯會趁機擴張領土！
俄羅斯知道美國要的不是領土，美國也怕俄羅斯太強才留著支那國牽制它
作者: alenquer 時間: 2017-3-21 09:38 PM
看完只覺得，盡可能別要有戰爭，因為對雙方都不好。
但，依舊要保持著可能會有戰爭的心態，因為不能對自己太好。
做任何事都要有最壞打算，台灣不能憑恃美國、日本會幫忙，而是要帶著全世界都不挺你的心態來面對中國。
簡單說，拋開「協防」、「條約」這些東西就對了！
作者: brook2006s 時間: 2017-3-21 09:57 PM
有些時候不是爸爸不幫你們，而是他也無能為力啊。原來你吧吧無能啊
作者: 8079645 時間: 2017-3-21 10:00 PM
礁溪伊莉 發表於 2017-3-21 08:08 PM
我是指這一篇,
來自於,
大陸觀察者網的"中文文章"~
蘭德公司報告原文
Statement of William H. Overholt1
Asia Policy Chair
Director, Center for Asia Pacific Policy
The RAND Corporation
Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission
May 19, 2005
Summary
China has transformed itself from the world’s greatest opponent of globalization, and
greatest disrupter of the global institutions we created, into a committed member of those
institutions and advocate of globalization. It is now a far more open economy than Japan
and it is globalizing its institutions to a degree not seen in a big country since Meiji
Japan. Adoption of the rule of law, of commitment to competition, of widespread use of
English, of foreign education, and of many foreign laws and institutions are not just
updating Chinese institutions but transforming Chinese civilization.
All of China’s economic successes are associated with liberalization and globalization,
and each aspect of globalization has brought China further successes. Never in world
history have so many workers improved their standards of living so rapidly. Thus
popular support for globalization is greater than in Japan, where postwar recovery
occurred in a highly managed economy, or with the former Soviet Union, where shock
therapy traumatized society. In consequence, China has effectively become an ally of
U.S. and Southeast Asian promotion of freer trade and investment than is acceptable to
Japan, India and Brazil.
____________
1 The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are the author’s alone
and should not be interpreted as representing those of RAND or any of the sponsors of its
research. This product is part of the RAND Corporation testimony series. RAND
testimonies record testimony presented by RAND associates to federal, state, or local
legislative committees; government-appointed commissions and panels; and private
review and oversight bodies. The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization
providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the
public and private sectors around the world. RAND’s publications do not necessarily
reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.
2
Nonetheless, rapid Chinese globalization has required stressful adjustments. State
enterprise employment has declined by 44 million. China has lost 25 million
manufacturing jobs. 125 car companies are expected to consolidate rapidly into 3 to 6.
China’s globalization successes are profoundly influencing its neighbors. India has
learned from China the advantages of a more open economy. Asians schooled in
antipathy to foreign investment and Latin Americans with protectionist traditions are
going to have to be more open to foreign investment and less dependent on loans in order
to compete with China. This will transform third world strategies of development and
create broader global opportunities for our companies.
Contrary to early fears, China’s rise has stimulated neighbors’ trade and foreign
investment rather than depriving them. Indeed China’s recent growth spurt revived
Japan’s economy and saved key neighbors from recession, possibly averting a dangerous
global downturn.
Chinese growth has brought American companies new markets. The flow of profits from
China to the U.S. is as disproportionate as the flow of goods. Inexpensive products have
substantially improved the living standards of poorer Americans. Inexpensive Chinese
goods and Chinese financing of our deficit have kept U.S. inflation and interest rates
down and prolonged our economic booms. At the same time, it has caused trade deficits
and social adjustments. Chinese misappropriation of intellectual property creates losses
for many of our companies. A manic construction and transportation boom has raised
global raw materials prices, to the great benefit of producers and a great cost to
consumers.
China’s success is one of the most important developments of modern history, but
projecting from current growth to Chinese global dominance or threats to our way of life
is just wrong. Unlike the old Soviet Union, reformist China does not seek to alter any
other country’s way of life. Its economy faces world history’s most severe combination
of banking, urbanization and employment challenges, and by 2020 a demographic
squeeze that will have few workers supporting many dependents. The best outcome for
us would be a China that is eventually like Japan, prosperous, winning in some sectors,
losing in others. Signs that China is making rapid progress in that direction should be
welcomed, not feared.
3
China and Globalization
Before reform, China was the world’s most important opponent of globalization. It had
an autarkic economy. It opposed the global economic order. It opposed the global
political order and the major global institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. It
believed that global disorder was a good thing, and under Mao Zedong it actively
promoted disorder throughout the world, including promotion of insurgencies in most of
China’s neighbors, in much of Africa and Latin America, and even in our universities.
Accompanying foreign policy disaffection was domestic cultural despair on a scale the
world has seldom witnessed. In the Cultural Revolution, 1966-1976, China’s students
and others, under the guidance of Mao Zedong’s peasant chiliasm, humiliated a majority
of senior government and party leaders, attacked the country’s major educational, social
and political institutions, destroyed much of China’s cultural heritage, and in general
tried to smash the country’s establishment.
For two centuries Chinese had tried a range of ways – socialism, capitalism, empire,
republic, warlords, religious fundamentalism, and others. All failed. Alienation was so
severe that, along with students, much of the country accepted that the world economic
and political order, and the Chinese economic and political order, were so stacked against
them that any path to success had to start with destruction of the existing order.
The Cultural Revolution was actually just one small episode in the problems that Chinese
impoverishment and political division created for the world and specifically for us. Had
China been prosperous and unified throughout the twentieth century, we would have had
European War II rather than World War II and World War I would have been quite
different. China would have been able to deter or defeat Japanese aggression. The cost
of those conflicts to the U.S. would have been radically smaller because Pearl Harbor and
much else would not have happened. We and the world, not to speak of a billion Chinese
citizens, have paid a horrible price, over more than a century, for China’s weakness. The
world needs a healthy China.
Because of China’s successful globalization we no longer have such problems. China is
no longer a vacuum that sucks the world’s great powers into gigantic conflicts. China no
4
longer sponsors insurgencies in Southeast Asia and Africa and Latin America. China no
longer seeks to undermine the global financial institutions. We obtain benefits from a
China that supports stable capitalist democracy in Thailand and the Philippines; that joins
the IMF, World Bank, and WTO; and that counsels its neighbors about the benefits of
political stability, free trade, and free investment.
From the beginning of the Cold War, it has been the central tenet of U.S. foreign policy
that, if we could engage as much of the world as possible in successful economic growth,
through domestic reform and what came later to be called globalization, we could
stabilize Europe and Asia, win the Cold War, and create a stable global order. Our
military protected this process, but from the Marshall Plan to our aid missions in Asia
and Africa, the core long-run strategy of our country has been to engage the world and
stabilize it by enmeshing other countries in a web of institutions and successful economic
practices that constitute the kind of world we want.
This strategy has proved to be one of the most successful geopolitical strategies in human
history, so much so that it has entangled our former enemies as well as our allies in the
web we wove. Throughout, it has stimulated many controversies, and occasional waves
of fear in this country. Key industries, including especially textiles and shoes, have
successively opposed liberal trade with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Southeast Asia,
China and Latin America. We had a wave of panic over whether Japan was going to take
over all manufacturing and buy all our most important assets; after all, if they could
triumph in steel, cars, and televisions, and buy Rockefeller Center, wasn’t everything in
our economy at risk? Elsewhere, weren’t we sponsoring horrible dictatorships by
encouraging the development of Taiwan and South Korea? Each time, our fears have
proved excessive, and each time our strategy triumphed. The results have been good for
our security, good for our prosperity, good for political liberalization overseas, and good
for the people of our trading partners. Our concerns about China are the same.
China’s globalization
What we never expected from our strategy was that it would entice our former
adversaries, including China, into our web of economic institutions and our commitment
to geopolitical stability.
5
Although joining late, China has joined the globalized system much more enthusiastically
than Japan. China’s economy is much more open than Japan. China’s trade in 2004 was
equal to 70% of its GDP, Japan’s to 24%. China received $60.6 billion of foreign direct
investment in 2004, while Japan, with an economy several times larger and in a phase of
restructuring that should have attracted disproportionate foreign investment, received
only $20.1 billion.
China’s globalization is not confined to opening the economy but more importantly to
globalization of institutions. Here the development strategy of contemporary China bears
a striking resemblance to that of early Meiji (mid-nineteenth century) Japan, when the
Japanese government was sending missions around the world to choose for emulation the
best foreign navy (Britain), the best foreign education system (Germany), and so forth.
In the intervening century and a half, Japanese practice has become more inward-looking,
while China has evolved from Qing defensiveness and Maoist peasant xenophobia to an
assimilative cosmopolitanism.
Today China is the country that sends missions throughout the world seeking best
practice. It adapts not just foreign technology and foreign corporate management
techniques but also a wide variety of foreign institutions and practices: international
accounting standards; British, U.S. and Hong Kong securities laws; French military
acquisition systems; a central bank structure modeled on the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank;
Taiwan-style regulations for foreign portfolio investment; an economic development
strategy adapted from South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan; and many others. Among the
most important of these changes are the decision to adopt the Western concept of rule of
law; adoption of competition as a centrally important economic practice; and adoption of
English language as virtually a second language for the educated Chinese population.
Today I can lecture in Peking University and interview senior officials in Beijing and
Shanghai without a translator. Perhaps most importantly, China has sent its elite youth
abroad for education in an exercise of internationalism comparable to the Romans turning
over their children to the Greeks.
Of course, such changes occur gradually; you can’t instantly introduce Western
accounting or Western law in a country that starts with no professional accountants or
lawyers. But the changes are startlingly fast compared with what other countries do.
More importantly, these are not technical adaptations in the manner of the old dynastic
6
efforts to pursue “Western technology, Chinese culture.” These are transformative
processes that in cases like rule of law and promotion of competition repudiate core
aspects of traditional Chinese civilization that go back for millennia.
China is also experiencing globalization of tastes. The exposure of the Chinese
population to foreign brands has been incorporating them into global culture. To take
one example, I spent many months studying the Chinese car industry. One of the
questions we were asked was whether China might develop indigenous car models in a
closed-off market like that of South Korea in the 1970s and 1980s. What we discovered
was that the Chinese people have been so much more exposed to global culture than
South Koreans of a generation ago that no car could succeed in China unless it
incorporated global designs and prestigious foreign technologies. Ten to thirty years ago,
when South Korea was at a phase of car industry development more comparable to China
today, one virtually never saw a European or American car on the road, and they are still
very rare today. But in China the roads are packed with Volkswagens and Buicks.
China has come to believe in globalization more than most third world countries and
many first world countries. China’s successes have all coincided with “reform and
opening,” that is, with globalization. In contrast, Japan’s and South Korea’s successes
occurred in an era when, although they were globalizing, they employed far stricter
controls on trade, foreign investment, and domestic economic activity than today’s
China.
Globalization has required extremely painful adjustments by China. Employment in the
state enterprises has declined from 110 million at the end of 1995 to 66 million in March
2005. Those who think there has been a simple transfer of U.S. manufacturing jobs to
China will be surprised to know that manufacturing jobs in China have declined from
over 54 million in 1994 to under 30 million today. Even these striking numbers
understate the adjustments China has had to accept due to greater competition and lately
from WTO membership. For instance, while employment in the car industry has
remained relatively constant, the number of car manufacturers is expected to decline from
125 at the peak to somewhere between three and six. Meanwhile, foreign joint ventures
have come to dominate much of the market.
7
It is hard to overstate the social adjustment Chinese are experiencing. But because China
has been willing to accept such adjustments, no large country in human history has ever
experienced such rapid improvements in living standards and working conditions. When
reform began, workers in Shanghai all wore the same clothes, looked tired and listless,
and seldom owned basic appliances like televisions or even watches. In the countryside
malnutrition was widespread. Today Shanghai workers wear colorful clothes and look
confident and energetic. Today the average Chinese family owns slightly more than one
television. Malnutrition has vanished. As a result, Chinese overwhelmingly support
further globalization.
China’s globalization and other countries
China’s globalization has of course strongly influenced other countries too. The most
important impact has been on India’s economic policy and performance. Since
independence India’s economy had been hobbled by extremely protectionist trade
policies, an antagonistic stance toward foreign direct investment, and a remarkable
network of domestic socialist economic controls called the license raj, combined with
strong foreign economic and political ties to the old Soviet Union. A 1991 foreign
exchange squeeze and neighboring China’s success shocked India and also showed that
abandoning the old hostility to globalization could lead to prosperity. While India started
later than China and moved more slowly, India’s economic growth rates have doubled.
The number of people in absolute poverty has declined sharply. Exports have boomed
and foreign exchange reserves are ample for the first time in modern history. Visit India
today, as I did last month, and you find the kind of hope and confidence and energy that
once seemed confined to East Asia.
As happened earlier with China, India’s newfound economic dynamism has shifted the
balance of leaders’ priorities from conflictful geopolitical goals to mutual economic
interests. India’s relations with its neighbors, sometimes including even Pakistan, and
most notably with both China and ourselves, are much better than previously. Indeed,
Indian-Chinese relations are better than at any time since the conflicts of the 1960s, and
India’s business community has shifted from terror about competition with China to
confidence in India’s competitive advantages and even some celebration of India’s recent
trade surplus with China.
8
China’s influence on India’s economic policies is just one example of a much wider
phenomenon that is probably just beginning. Until recently, most of the third world plus
Japan has taken a relatively hostile attitude toward foreign direct investment. Difficult
licensing requirements, high taxes, unfair judicial treatment and an negative opinion
climate have faced direct investors from Japan and South Korea to the Philippines and
Thailand to India, not to mention most of Latin America. Instead of accepting foreign
ownership, countries typically relied on foreign loans (South Korea, Southeast Asia,
Latin America) or domestic loans (Japan), frequently creating an excessive burden of
debt. Thailand imposed very high taxes and then reduced them for selected foreign
investors; Indian groups attacked Kentucky Fried Chicken with distorted hygiene
allegations. Now such tactics are waning.
The success of China at balancing debt with equity, building upon the previous successes
of Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore, is gradually changing the way much of the world
manages economic development. This Chinese influence is going to be transformative,
particularly in Asia. The old pattern has been to avoid dependence on foreign investment
by taking domestic and foreign bank loans. Governments then controlled the
development of industry by channeling the bank loans. This made companies and
countries overly dependent on banks, leading to periodic financial crises. It gave
governments too much control over industries, encouraging mismanagement and
corruption. It gave unfair advantages to large, politically favored companies over smaller
companies and foreign companies. Importantly for us, it limited the opportunities for our
own companies. Now competition with China will force most companies to open
themselves to foreign investment. American companies will benefit not just in China but
throughout the world.
At the beginning of this decade, there were widespread fears that China’s success would
suck the trade and investment away from its Asian neighbors, impoverishing them. In
the event, the opposite has happened. Wherever rules have been changed to welcome
foreign direct investment, as in India, South Korea, and Japan, such investment has
boomed. China has taught others to attract foreign investment, and in response the total
pool of foreign investment has greatly expanded.
Amid the global slowdown following the tech bust, countries like South Korea and the
Philippines found themselves saved from recession by Chinese demand. Most
9
importantly, Chinese demand provided the stimulus that lifted Japan out of recession. It
is difficult to overstate the risk the world economy faced from the Japanese situation,
where mountainous debt created the risk of a domino-like collapse inside Japan and
subsequent rippling collapses around the world. That risk seems to have passed, helped
by a critical margin of stimulus from China. Few books are written about global
depressions that never happened, but it is quite possible that China’s globalization saved
us from beginning the new century with a drastic global economic squeeze.
Many other peoples have benefited from Chinese demand that rose just as the world
economy was slowing. Raw materials producers had become inured to terms of trade that
deteriorated inexorably year after year. Suddenly our ally Australia found that its terms
of trade have improved to the best in its entire history, largely because of Chinese
demand. Many of the world’s poorest countries, including Laos, Papua New Guinea, and
much of Africa, benefited just when they needed it most. No aid programs, no IMF gold
sales could have come close to providing the improved livelihoods that resulted from
increasing, sustained demand for their products.
In short, the most important results of China’s rise are the same as the results for the
world of America’s rise or of the recoveries of Japan and Europe: you are always better
off with a rich neighbor than with a denizen of the slums.
Benefits and costs for the U.S.
China’s globalization has had numerous impacts on the U.S. Most obviously, China has
become a vast market for U.S. goods. Arguments that this is a mythic “China Dream”
have proved false. Coca Cola has long since surpassed the fabled goal of selling a billion
Cokes. General Motors, once ridiculed by the China Dream theory, sells many Buicks in
China, and, despite a current cyclical pause, profits from China have been a critical
margin for GM during a difficult time. We gain from billions of dollars of profits
remitted back to our country and from the improved health of our most successful
companies as they compete against other foreign companies.
Lower prices for basic goods have contributed significantly to American standards of
living, particularly for our less prosperous citizens. While we do not yet have definitive
studies, indications are that lower-income Americans achieve improvements in their
10
standards of living of perhaps 5% to 10% as a result of being able to buy lower-priced
imports from China. That impact is undoubtedly expanded by the fact that competition
from China drives other countries to produce less expensive goods for our consumption.
Inexpensive Chinese goods have kept down our inflation rates and enabled us to prolong
the upswings of our business cycles because the Fed doesn’t have to raise interest rates so
quickly in order to slow inflation. Similarly, Chinese purchases of U.S. Treasury bonds
have helped to finance our budget deficits. Without those Chinese purchases we would
either have to raise interest rates, slowing our growth, or we would have to run
comparable trade deficits with other countries so that they could buy our bonds.
We are just beginning to see another layer of benefits. The Chinese are beginning to
invest here. Haier is now manufacturing refrigerators in this country. When China’s
Lenovo bought IBM’s personal computer business, it saved jobs in a moribund division,
freed IBM to move up into higher-tech markets, and helped finance that IBM move up.
So far, this trend is small, but it will grow quickly. China’s goal for this year is to spend
$30-40 billion buying resource and distribution companies.
We also benefit indirectly from China’s boost to foreign economies like Japan and
Australia. Having a prosperous partner is invaluable to the U.S. economy. We spent the
1980s fretting about Japan taking over the world, but we spent the 1990s worrying that
Japan wasn’t doing its share to boost global growth. Those who worry about China’s
success would have far more to worry about if China’s growth slowed drastically.
Adjustment problems
China’s globalization and growth also cause stresses for us. Some of these are politically
eternal but economically and strategically tired. As countries get rich, the manufacture of
textiles, and shoes, furniture and basic consumer electronics mostly migrates elsewhere.
The manufacture of socks migrated from here to Japan, from Japan to South Korea and
Taiwan, and thence to Southeast Asia and now China. That adjustment will continue. It
has been gradual over many decades. We have had ten years to get ready for the current
round of textile adjustments. We knew what was coming and we agreed to it, in return
for China so stressful that they are virtually beyond Americans’ imagination. Our own
adjustments are smaller than those of virtually any other country.
11
These adjustments are smaller than we tend to believe, because China gets blamed for
much that it does not cause. Virtually all of our job loss has been caused by productivity
improvements. In fact, productivity gains have been sufficiently large that we should
have experienced more job losses than we have. It is conceivable that our job losses have
been smaller than they “should” have been because China has helped us adapt. We don’t
know, because no lobby has been interested in paying for the research to find out how
many jobs have been saved by partial moves to China decreasing the costs of endangered
companies. And China is, of course, just part of a global readjustment caused by China,
India, and the former Soviet Union joining our economic system.
A more serious policy problem is hyper-competition created by cheap financing in China.
The irrationalities of the Chinese financial system mean that in key sectors like steel
China builds too many factories, and props up too many moribund companies, causing
massive overcapacity. In recent years Chinese financial vagaries have led to excessive
construction and huge demand for steel, aluminum, cement and others. For a while this
has buoyed the global steel industry, including ours. But it has also led to construction of
so many steel factories in China that soon China will have half of all world capacity.
That means overproduction and eventually a steel price bust.
This cycle creates problems for our industry, just as our Internet mania and tech bubble
created problems for much of the world. It is fair for us to complain about such
problems. It is fair to pressure the Chinese to reform their financial practices. It may be
fair in some cases to view Chinese bank lending practices as constituting an inappropriate
subsidy. The tone of our complaints and the substance of our policies needs, however, to
reflect three facts. First, the Chinese are trying to reform their banks and put them on a
market basis. Second, our financial vagaries cause them problems too. Third, the biggest
price for their financial mismanagement will eventually be paid by them, because
inappropriate lending eventually makes troubled banks much more troubled. China
making steel today looks like Japan buying Rockefeller Center two decades ago; if you
project their excesses indefinitely into the future, first the Japanese and now the Chinese
look as if they are about to take over everything in the world. But when you look at their
underlying finances, you see a black hole. The Japanese spent the 1990s in their black
hole and are still trying to climb out. China will feel the pain of its recent spree for many
years. Having said these things, some excesses may require a policy response by us.
12
Chinese theft of intellectual property has become a major issue. The IPR problems
presented by China are similar to those presented by other developing countries. In the
1930s, Japan built cars that were half Ford parts and half GM parts, with DeSoto styling.
In the early days of Japan’s postwar takeoff, a high proportion of its electronics exports
infringed Texas Instruments’ patents. I, like numerous others, accumulated a library of
knockoff books from Taiwan in the 1970s, and Taiwan still has the best knockoff
watches. When I lived in Singapore in 1998, I could get knockoffs of most Hollywood
movies at a six-story building within five minutes’ walk of my office, and indeed well
into the 1990s official U.S. government briefings credited Singapore for some 70% of the
knockoff computer software in Asia – at a time when China was getting most of the
blame. China’s IPR practices today are not very different from those of India and
Russia. But the scale and efficiency of China, and the extent of foreign direct investment
in China, make the issue a larger one. Indeed, the IPR losses caused by Chinese practices
are probably on a scale with those of other major emerging markets, like for instance
American youth. It is appropriate for us to make very strong representations about IPR
abuses. It is appropriate for us to implement policies that punish bad behavior and
reward better behavior. It is also useful to maintain a certain historical perspective.
The other side of the benefits Australia, Africa, Latin America, and other resource
providers (including part of our own economy) have received from Chinese demand is a
rise in prices for consumers, and we are more consumer than producer of raw materials.
For many key materials, the biggest part of recent price rises has been cyclical. The
Chinese mania for steel, aluminum and cement has peaked. In the case of petroleum, the
cumulative increase in demand caused by China, India, Russia, and other developing
countries may soon push against long-run supply constraints. This may compel us to
make new, potentially urgent decisions about conservation, the kind of energy we use
and the degree to which we compete or collaborate with the other major users. This
would have happened eventually even without the rise of China, but China is certainly
accelerating the issue.
Finally, the rise of China raises questions about whether we face a major challenge to our
role in the world or to our way of life. One part of this is easy. We do not face a
challenge to our way of life. Unlike the Soviet Union, and unlike China under Mao
13
Zedong, reformist China does not seek to change the way we organize ourselves or the
world, but rather to join the world system we have created.
Geopolitical competition raises more complicated issues. Like South Korea, as China
grows it gets stronger. Its military becomes more modern. In one particular area, the
Taiwan Straits, maintaining our dominance will become increasingly difficult. That is a
serious and difficult and legitimate challenge for our military to cope with. But theories
that China is going to take over the world suffer from the same flaws as theories two
decades ago that Japan was going to take over the world. The Chinese military has to
defend 11,000 miles of not-always-friendly borders, and its growing military is far from
excessive for the tasks it faces. Economically, China is not going to manufacture
everything in the world; no country can have a comparative advantage in everything.
In the medium term China faces daunting challenges. Its banks are the worst in the world
that we know about. In each generation a population about the size of the United States
will move from China’s countryside to its cities. Each year 12-13 million new workers
join the work force. The impact of productivity on employment in manufacturing is
much more severe than in our country. All these people need jobs. For a considerable
period China’s high growth can be sustained, but only through heroic reform measures by
China’s leaders. If somehow China powers through these problems, by 2020 its aging
population will have the worst ratio of workers to non-workers of any population in the
world, including Japan’s. That is to say, without some miraculous new policies the
Chinese economy may well hit a wall in that period. In 2020, they will still be a very
poor country by our standards. Even if their success continues until then, they will not be
taking over the world.
The emergence of China as a principal advocate of globalization and stability creates a
complex geopolitical situation for us. On issues of free trade and investment, and on a
variety of economic issues like GMO crops, China is our principal ally. On North Korea,
despite differences over tactics, we share the same goal and China is our only effective
partner. On terrorism and crime, China is our principal Asian ally. We are now in a
novel situation where Japan is our military ally and partial ideological soulmate, but
China is effectively our ally on the important political and economic issues, with Japan
either ineffectual or in opposition to us. This is a novel historical situation.
14
Where Chinese influence has increased greatly at our expense, other than the unique
situation in the Taiwan Straits, it has been because we and our traditional allies created a
vacuum, not because China has aggressively asserted power. But there have been
important shifts, and we need to be very conscious of them. On the dangerous North
Korean issue, we have been divided at home, and our allies, most notably South Korea,
have disagreed with our tactics. We have demanded that China play the central role, and
China was hesitant to accept the invitation. In Southeast Asia, we have traditionally
earned loyal support by organizing our policies around a core value of economic growth
through liberalization and globalization. Today we are perceived as having abandoned
that priority in favor of a more military focus on the war on terror, while China is seen
having abandoned its Maoist geopolitical priorities in favor of a priority for mutual
economic development through multilateral liberalization. Within our economic policies
we are seen as having abandoned multilateral liberalization in favor of highly politicized
bilateral free trade agreements, while China has become the principal supporter of
multilateralism. China carefully joined ASEAN on trade, rather than asserting its own
vision. Without exception, Southeast Asian (and many other Asian) elites see the 2003
APEC summit as a watershed that marked the U.S. and Chinese reversal of roles. The
result of these Korean and Southeast Asian developments is a sea change in Asian
geopolitics, but we are the ones who made the changes, not China, and we still can take
the initiative if we wish to do so.
We Americans must be very clear about the difference between success and failure.
When our system of institutions and relationships pulls the unstable China of 1870 and
the destructive China of 1970 into coherence, prosperity and support of the major global
institutions that we have created, it is success for us, not failure. In fact, it is one of the
great successes of history. When we have a prosperous economic partner, at the cost of
historically minor adjustments, that is success for us, not failure. Of course, our
successes to date provide no absolute assurance that China will always be friendly or
supportive of our institutions. But if we welcome China’s prosperity, we maximize the
chances of an auspicious outcome. If we reject it, we ensure the worst outcome.
The best outcome for our relationship with a globalized China is that China becomes like
Japan, a prosperous competitor with whom we have a mutually beneficial division of
labor. Hopefully China will absorb useful political lessons from its Asian neighbors, and
hopefully Japan and South Korea will learn the economic lessons of China’s superior
15
openness to our
“In 2020, they will still be a very poor country by our standards.”怎麼翻譯呢？即使英語水平最差的人都知道是“到2020年，以我們的標准衡量中國仍然是一個窮國。”
此句以下的內容何文與蘭德公司報告原文完全不符，不知所云，完全是夾帶的“私貨”。其實稍有腦子的人就可以看出這是風格迥異的東西的“PS”。既然大紀元的記者，那麼他為何這樣自由發揮譯稿也不難理解。蘭德公司如果真寫出后面的東西，那麼估計誰也不會要他們做咨詢。奉勸閣下多讀點書，即使不懂英文，最起碼中文的基本閱讀能力不要喪失。不然總是出來丟人現眼終歸是不好的
作者: revee1977 時間: 2017-3-21 10:30 PM
本帖最後由 revee1977 於 2017-3-21 10:42 PM 編輯
礁溪伊莉 發表於 2017-3-21 08:08 PM
我是指這一篇,
來自於,
大陸觀察者網的"中文文章"~
你這篇分明是造假好不好，它的真是出處是一個網友的網文，被移花接木的冠以蘭德，也就你這白痴能信。
作者: revee1977 時間: 2017-3-21 10:34 PM
8079645 發表於 2017-3-21 10:00 PM
蘭德公司報告原文
Statement of William H. Overholt1
那位礁先生的智商一直是硬傷。
作者: th314a 時間: 2017-3-21 10:39 PM
看到第一行就笑了
同時飛2000多架戰機?
這還不包航中共的、台灣的
最好台灣的領空擠的下
作者: 礁溪伊莉 時間: 2017-3-21 10:45 PM
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作者: 礁溪伊莉 時間: 2017-3-21 10:51 PM
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作者: 8079645 時間: 2017-3-21 10:56 PM
礁溪伊莉 發表於 2017-3-21 10:45 PM
拜託~
"In 2020, they will still be a very poor country by our standards"
你這閱讀能力真是，唉。。。。。
算了，台灣人的智商啊。
In 2020, they will still be a very poor country by our standards這句話的直譯：到2020年，以我們的標准衡量中國仍然是一個很貧窮的國家。
我除了少加了一個修飾語之外，主体意思是無誤的。
但是你的精神信仰大紀元是怎麼翻譯的？“2020年，中國將成為世界上最窮的國家”
且不說整個語法時態都不對，干脆就是兩個意思，和原文几乎不沾邊。
到底是誰在自慰啊？
自願慰安婦后代，礁先生
作者: vvikimo 時間: 2017-3-21 10:56 PM
想太多，
真正會發生的是中美對抗，
而不是台海對峙。
作者: revee1977 時間: 2017-3-21 10:57 PM
本帖最後由 revee1977 於 2017-3-21 11:02 PM 編輯
礁溪伊莉 發表於 2017-3-21 10:51 PM
你們看,
這就是"大陸五毛"的嘴臉囉~....
問題是你的引文根本就是造假文，其原文出處是《What is China》，作者是香港學生梁珩孜（Leung Heng Chi），英文名Aaran，網名kakarudo。
跟蘭德的william H. Overholt《中國與全球化》一點關系都沒有
作者: revee1977 時間: 2017-3-21 11:01 PM
本帖最後由 revee1977 於 2017-3-21 11:01 PM 編輯
礁溪伊莉 發表於 2017-3-21 10:51 PM
你們看,
這就是"大陸五毛"的嘴臉囉~....
蘭德並無所謂的《2020年，中國將成為世界上最窮的國家》報告，只有
蘭德公司William H. Overholt，的《中國與全球化》中有一句“In 2020, they will still be a very poor country by our standards.”
你上面回復中的大把引文，沒有一個字是出自《中國與全球化》這篇報告的
我們不臉紅，倒是不知道你這個蠢物臉紅不臉紅
作者: eastwind21d 時間: 2017-3-21 11:03 PM
礁溪伊莉 發表於 2017-3-21 10:51 PM
你們看,
這就是"大陸五毛"的嘴臉囉~....
請問你有沒有看過英文原文, 我大慨看了部份(實在太長), 明顯與你 post 的不同, 可不可以認真點, 我認識那位台灣博士朋友寫的英文己經令我不忍心窒他, 你也這樣, 會令我覺得你們學的英文有問題.
作者: 8079645 時間: 2017-3-21 11:14 PM
礁溪伊莉 發表於 2017-3-21 10:51 PM
你們看,
這就是"大陸五毛"的嘴臉囉~....
不愧是自願慰安婦后代啊，臉皮之厚堪比城牆。
你不是非說我PO文造假麼？
我把原文地址給你，你自己說哪造假了。
http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9858z3.html
作者: 礁溪伊莉 時間: 2017-3-21 11:29 PM
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作者: 8079645 時間: 2017-3-21 11:42 PM
礁溪伊莉 發表於 2017-3-21 11:29 PM
大家看,
這就是大陸五毛,
嚴以律人, 寬以待己的"惡霸邏輯"~....
唉，不愧香港人給你們取了個綽號叫鬼島井蛙。
這智商簡直堪比單細胞生物。
能自願去做慰安婦，大腦回路果然讓人嘆為觀止啊。
不懂英文也就算了，這漢語水平也這幅德行。
“到2020年，以我們的標准衡量中國仍然是一個很貧窮的國家。”與“2020年，中國將成為世界上最窮的國家”是同一個意思？
請問你語文老師的棺材板結不結實？
作者: 礁溪伊莉 時間: 2017-3-21 11:43 PM
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作者: 礁溪伊莉 時間: 2017-3-21 11:47 PM
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